

The Surge Collective Memory Project

Interviewee: David Satterfield

Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, 2002-2009
Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Baghdad, 2002-2006

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SAYLE Tim Sayle from Southern Methodist University.

SATTERFIELD David Satterfield.

O'SULLIVAN: Great. David, thank you so much for joining us. We have considered you to be a real key voice in this conversation, in this debate. And we're thrilled to have the chance to interview you in person on one of your trips to Washington --

SATTERFIELD Happy to be here.

O'SULLIVAN: -- from the region. So we'd like to begin -- and as you know, part of this conversation -- and we'll keep it a fluid conversation -- but, part of this conversation is not just for us who have been part of this process, but also for future historians and students. So we want to set some of the backdrop. Information that all of us in this room know, but is good to have on the record. And so I thought, given that you are one of these people who really played multiple roles in Iraq policy over time, if you could [00:01:00] begin by telling us what your positions were in 2006 in both the timing of your move from Baghdad back to Washington, a little bit about what your responsibilities were in those different positions.

SATTERFIELD: Certainly. Until July of 2006, I was alternately Deputy Chief of Mission, Charge d'Affaires, at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. And in that role, I had direction of the management of the U.S. mission, with the important caveat that because at the time U.S. forces in Iraq were under a specified command when I say charge of the U.S. mission, it was a charge in parallel with that exercise by the

commanding officer of the MNF-I, Multi- National Force - Iraq. They were separate lines. And indeed, one of the issues which merit discussion is how the separate lines of action between the embassy diplomatic civilian [00:02:00] effort in Iraq ultimately became coincided with the military lines of effort. That was not the case in 2006 as we approached the issue of the Surge which we'll

well as direct assessment and recommendations to ~~or~~ on what her position should be in the interagency policy. And more broadly, whether there was a better, more effective direction of U.S. policy overall to achieve success in Iraq or mitigate damage in Iraq.

O'SULLIVAN: And you were also really the point person, at [00:04:00] a senior level, with Interagency.

SATTERFIELD: Exactly. Exactly.

O'SULLIVAN: So you're in this great position to talk to us about the conditions on the ground in Iraq in the first part of 2006, and then you can talk to us about what happened in Washington, and how things unfolded around the decision-making time. So let's start with the first bit. You were in Iraq for the first half of the 2006. Can you just give us a description of what was the situation like? And then we'll morph into the question of how did you perceive U.S. strategy? What did you perceive it to be at the time, and how successful? But let's just start just describing the situation.

SATTERFIELD: Certainly. Discussion of the situation at the beginning of 2006 requires discussion of the situation as it emerged in the middle and latter part of 2005. And the hallmark here was a series of negative directions in terms of the following: ability of the Iraqi security forces [00:05:00] to assume real responsibility for maintaining security and stability in the country, particularly in Anbar- Ninawa province and in Baghdad itself. Second principal problem, or negative trend line,

the emergence of distinct sectarian markers to the violence the beginnings of what, in 2006, emerged full-bore as population cleansing or separation under force with considerable casualties. High lethality in Baghdad itself, but not only in Baghdad-- that is, Shia-Sunni fighting with a distinct sectarian edge; the emergence of both indigenous and Iranian-backed and directed Sharia militia, quite violent in their conduct, from the South, the Basra area, through to Baghdad and other regions where sectarian seam lines existed. And a moment to step apart on context, [00:06:00] Baghdad is not as many argued easily separable into sectarian communities. Nor is, or was, Iraq as whole. Kurdish communities, non-Kurdish Sunni Arab communities, Shia communities existed throughout the country, side by side, intermingled. It was never an easy picture to cleanly carve out, separate out. The emergence of Shia entities, Sunni entities were very hard to see on the map, short of violent expulsion of communities, cleansing of communities -- an assertion of the will and presence of only one sectarian group, the efficacy of U.S. efforts to address the two problems, ineffectiveness of Iraqi security force efforts on security and stability, emergence of sectarian trends in the violence. Emergence of violent criminal and militia sectarian-oriented [00:07:00] gangs in Baghdad in the south became a second major area to focus upon

Now, the U.S. had been engaged for quite some time in a training effort to build up secta

called MNSTC-I [Multi -National Security Transition] Command-Iraq,

as it were, "to send the rockets up. Where they come down is somebody else's business."

This opened a quite profound debate in Washington and in the field. You mean, we have been training and reporting as green X tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers who cannot be accounted for? They don't exist in the field? Well, yes. And this was never an issue of feedback or report back [00:10:00]. As I like to present it, you know the inputs, how many people have gone into training. You know the outputs, how many individuals, at what assessed level of proficiency have emerged from training. But what about the outcome? So how many units are actually in the field, effectively deployed? Great statistics on the first two. Very vague understanding or assessment of what really matters - the outcome of this whole costly, elaborate process. So, here you have in late '05, the beginning of significant questioning as to the entire process of training up Iraqi security forces to be able to take the fight vice the U.S., which was planning throughout '05, on a progressive draw down of forces. Don Rumsfeld's intent was to pull out U.S. forces at the fastest pace possible, consistent with the stand up of Iraqis. As Iraqis stand up, we will [00:11:00] stand back, and then we will stand down, was the rubric applied.

Beginning of '06, all of the trend lines that I've just described -- emerging sectarian violence, serious questions about the Iraqi force police and security to achieve effective actions on the ground to counter these trends.

explode. February is the Golden, or Askari Mosque explosion. Why? Why target that mosque?

gun, at the blade of a knife. More and more of the counts we received each morning in Baghdad were of how many bodies had been found washed up in the water treatment center: dumped into canals, [00:16:00] dumped into the river, and caught as it entered the plant. This was extremely distressing, because if it continued, a true civil war was actually possible.

That is what Zarqawi, the leader of AQIM, was seeking could well have been potentially achievable. Now, Zawahiri, the functional head of core Al-Qaeda, was greatly concerned by all of this. He did not believe this was an appropriate tactic for Al-Qaeda to be engaging in, and could ultimately revert back in a negative fashion on Al-Qaeda. But Zarqawi broke away and would not follow the guidance from core Al-Qaeda - another indicator of the phenomenon we've seen in the decade since, where the actual ability of core Al-Qaeda -- so-called -- to direct the different franchises and affiliates gets less and less, and the affiliates take on a multi-headed existence. Much harder to confront, much harder to eliminate, [00:17:00] much harder to address from a CT standpoint. So, civil war is looming. The security forces are ineffective in confronting it, or are complicit to some extent, in the violence.

What does the U.S. do? The U.S. begins a Baghdad focused series of operations. The latest of which were the *Mān ila Al-Amam*, the Together Forward Operations. The operations built by the U.S. military -- its command in Iraq as well as the Pentagon -- as the necessary joint operations to both establish

SATTERFIELD: I believe strongly that the drafting of the Iraqi constitution, the elections, indeed, Maliki's initial assumption of office were, in fact, positive developments. The Iraqi constitution is just that. It was an Iraqi constitution. While we provided recommendations, advice, while we emphasized certain points that we wanted included in the constitution, and in fact, had a separate ostensibly U.S.-shaped constitution drafting process, to their credit, the Iraqis themselves had a [00:20:00] parallel constitution drafting process led by a very competent and capable Shia parliamentarian, Humam Hamoudi. That process yielded, on the Iraqi side, the ultimate document that emerged. It had significant input in terms of our recommendations on critical points of what we believe constitutes democratic society from the U.S., but it was an Iraqi document. And that was, without any question, a success I still believe that constitution was the best Arab constitution to ever emerge in the Middle East. And frankly, with the exception of the new

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Finally, Maliki 's election. Much has been written and spoken of as to how Nouri al-Maliki came to be prime minister. He came to be prime minister as the result of an Iraqi internal decision primarily, and initially, within the Shia Iraqi political community . He was not the product of an American decision, save only in the context that we did not believe that continuing with the previous prime minister, Jaafari, was likely to produce a success in terms of leadership of Iraq under increasingly challenging circumstances [00:22:00]

There was a significant debate as to whether there was an alternative to Jaafari in the person of Adil Abdul-Mahdi . Adil Abdul-Mahdi was, and is, a gentleman, a scholar, and a true Iraqi patriot. But the question mark was not over his character or personality, but whether he would be able to take an independent position from Iran, from Iranian -backed militias , particularly the Badr Organization, which was, in fact, the militia arm of his own political structure . In the end, after considerable debate, the assessment was made that Adil, for all of his strengths, did not have the ability to take an independent command position, to seek an independent power base apart from Badr and apart from Iran . And again, as 2005 moved on it was quite clear that was going to have to be done by the next prime minister.

Maliki emerged as [00:23:00] the consequence of those two ~~ad-09 (0)g)-E(i)22 (2)Ft-(1~~

self-assess the efficacy of their operations and actions was questionable. Too many proclamations of success in too many operations that really failed. Failed as they were being conducted, much less after they were over. I was not "suspicious"; that's a wrong term. I had reservations as to the ability of the military to get this right, or to self-assess.

O'SULLIVAN: And that basically covers --[00:28:00] unless you want to add something to it -- how you were seeing Washington's viewpoint. Did you think that Washington had some bias that needed to be addressed? As well as Washington needed to be better apprised of the situation that you were experiencing on the ground?

SATTERFIELD: Yes, Meghan, I did. I believed in Washington there was too much inertia, too much of a sense of an ultimatic [

interviews. Do you remember that memo? D

not look like it is leading to a success by any definition, much less the President's own declared definitions of success, and that leaving Iraq under these circumstances is really not something that can be contemplated. The issue is, what do we do? Now, there are not, initially, in July and August, clear lines of thinking as to, there are four options, three options, five options. But one begins to hear the emergence of broad trends in the interagency senior level discussions.

The first big question is, is there anything at all that we can do, other than mitigate damage, to broader [00:32:00] issues in the Middle East? Try to mitigate damage within Iraq? Focus our efforts on the things that we might be able to do? Stop the worst potential disasters in Iraq? But not try to stage manage, intervene, or affect everything. Not because as a policy matter we should not, but because we may not have the capacity despite the will, to effect that goal. Secretary Rice is deeply, personally concerned that, in fact, we are failing. We may not have the ability, literally may not have the ability to affect events by the selective application, or the different application, of military force. She, at this point-- which is now latter part of summer 2006, but not yet the fall -- is deeply skeptical of the military's ability to actually [00:33:00] address the emergent sectarian pre-civil war, proto-civil war situation in Iraq. And she is very keenly concerned with the impact of an exclusive focus on Iraq on other regional developments. Iraq is taking the air out of the room on every other policy issue the U.S.

O'SULLIVAN: Can you say a little bit more about that, because this is the time of the Israeli war in Lebanon. That sense of, Iraq is a big distraction, because Iraq of course is your primary responsibility at the time.

SATTERFIELD: There was very much a sense that we, as a nation, were being viewed exclusively through an Iraq success or failure prism. And we ourselves had cast that prism and were keeping it in prominent position. With every speech, with every iteration of maximal [00:34:00] goals and achievements in Iraq as the measure of a success or failure, we were setting ourselves up for problems elsewhere in the Middle East

And the Middle East had many problems. Not just the Lebanon development, but Iran-related issues. Other questions -- both CT and non-CT -- that Iraq was dominating. Not because Iraq itself was a factor in these other issues, but the ability, the bandwidth available to the U.S. government to manage other issues, and the consumption of our key partners in the Middle East by our own focus on Iraq, made dealing with those other pressing and significant for U.S. national security issues, more and more difficult. We could not pull back the policy lens, because we kept it almost exclusively focused on Iraq.

O'SULLIVAN: In light of that, what kind of instructions or requests or taskings did Secretary Rice give you around that time? Did she say, "Hey, help us come up [00:35:00] with an alternative strategy"? Or was it this idea of, let's open the aperture? Was there an explicit goal?

SATTERFIELD: The Secretary asked Phil and I to take a deep dive on what could be done free-flowing. She did not prescribe or proscribe any potential outcomes to this. Let me know your assessment I want a detailed look at all aspects of Iraq civil, military, security, political. You tell me what you think is happening. Tell me where you think it is going to go. And tell me what you think are U.S. options, or U.S. plus allied, i.e. Arab state, broader coalition building efforts -- political coalition, military coalition building efforts -- to address these concerns From inside, from outside. And so that is what we worked on.

O'SULLIVAN: And what time frame was this?

SATTERFIELD: This was latter part of summer 2006.

O'SULLIVAN: [00:36:00] So more or less around the same time is when you joined the NSC team for our thinking about the options.

SATTERFIELD: That's right.

O'SULLIVAN: Because, as we've been discussing in all of our interviews, and you will remember, there are all these nodes popping up all over --

SATTERFIELD: This I recall profoundly. Yes.

O'SULLIVAN: So I'm not going to ask you any leading questions, but can you tell us -- we'll come back to your endeavors with Phil, because those are very important -- but can you tell us, where did you perceive the NSC to be? And how did you see their efforts? Were they just floating out there in some untethered world or did you see there was a gathering momentum?

SATTERFIELD: What was happening in the NCS at Steve's direction was exactly the same thing that was happening within State. This is not going well. You have the President declaring a set of goals and objectives. What is being achieved on the ground [00:37:00] are nowhere close, right now, to meeting those goals. And indeed, the objectives that had been achieved in terms of political process are fundamentally threatened now by the deteriorating security environment. What do we do? But not driven by a DoD, "Everything tracks with getting U.S. forces out," but a zero-base look at what ought to be the U.S. force set in Iraq. Is there a relationship between U.S. force numbers, presence, activities and stabilizing the situation? NSC was looking at precisely the same issues we were looking at Secretary Rice's direction at State. At least that was my perception throughout this period.

O'SULLIVAN: And on the DoD point, did you think -- I'm reading into what you're saying -- that both the NSC and State felt this had to be done without DoD for this moment, because of an overriding [00:38:00] policy lens that DoD had? Or was it just that it's important to start internally, get your thoughts together before everybody engages in the interagency debate?

SATTERFIELD: It was, frankly, both. It was the need to organize at a political policy level as opposed to uniform service level, certain frames of reference, questions to ask. But it was also -- and again, I can't avoid this -- a clear perception that many of the critical interlocutors in DoD, from the chairman down, were constrained by

Secretary Rumsfeld from expressing a position which contrasted or contradicted
Rumsfeld's doctrine of standing down in Iraq as ra

on how many BCTs

Secretary Rice Can you talk about what was in that paper? What was the outcome of your study?

SATTERFIELD:Yes Bottom lines up front, the U.S. had achieved --[00:44:00] had helped Iraqis achieve significant political advances Those advances were now being fundamentally threatened by sectarian violence, by the inciting and inflaming effect of AQIM; by the AQIM terrorist presence itself in Ninawa

a moment -- ineffectiveness of U.S. military actions in the past, particularly the
[00:46:00] disastrous Baghdad campaigns- the Together Forwards one, two, three
-- led us to believe we needed a different approach And that approach is one in
which we did not walk away from Iraq, but rather chose our fights. It was, if you
will, containment and mitigation of profound damage, rather than an attempt to
continue the exposure-- increase the exposure -of U.S. forces to no likely
prospect of success coupled with an external policy which was a much more
aggressive than the previous one. It was a much more aggressive policy which was a much more

challenges going on in Iraq which are being managed and looked at. I have, others have, responsibility for those things as well. But this is a direct advice to the principal, to the Secretary of State, and through her to the President, on fundamental policy issues. And so two parallel things are happening. We're working that, but we're also working the operational requirements of this vast machine that is the U.S. civilian-military presence in Iraq, which is huge and hugely time consuming. [00:50:00] My dewrha3Td (.)TjJ9Df 2 (h002 Tw -25.96 -2.44 .Wa3Td

just a containment, as you've described it.

SATTERFIELD: Yes. First, I would note, the informal discussions were hugely useful. The informal discussions -- which you, Meghan, directed -- were critical to forming the policy recommendation lines for the formal study. Had we jumped to the formal study minus those weeks of the informal meetings, it would have been a very difficult thing to have done. In fact, this entire process, relative to other interagency policy discussions at this level [00:52:00] of seriousness with the President, went amazingly rapidly. Not slowly. And I'm still impressed by the speed and efficiency with which the divisions, the agreements, the recommendations were formalized and presented for ultimate decision.

So you're quite right in the description of the tidy

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other sources of stability and security within the Iraqi context, and try to avoid the endless fixation with Baghdad as a whole.

O'SULLIVAN: And how did that proposal play into the review? What were the criticisms? What were the points where you found resonance?

SATTERFIELD: Within the review -- both the informal and the formal process -- I think it's fair to say key points of policy difference emerged in the following way. First, the basic question: Was there more U.S. forces could do? Not in a different role -- that is, a stand back [00:54:00] role, limited goals, limited triggers for intervention -- but could the U.S. actually affect, with the present or with an increased, that is, a steady state or with an increased -- what came to be called a surge option -- presence of forces, could it achieve the absolute goals: Stop this violence? Stabilize, in an enduring fashion, the situation in Baghdad? Address the shift, the violence, in Anbar and Ninawa directed against the Iraqi government and coalition? That is, basically, could we succeed on a big level -- the President's big level -- by adding more military forces? Shifting the way those additional military forces acted, but not diminishing the goals? That was one key division.

Second division, Baghdad: Could you ignore Baghdad? Could you, in fact, have a coherent, politically stable, marginally stable, [00:55:00] Iraq if Baghdad wasn't stable? And what did it take to stabilize Baghdad? Which fed us back into the issue of U.S. forces: So there was a challenge there to whether decentralization was even possible without fragmentation and further violence emerging. It was a

achievethis [00:59:00] goal? And secondly, the “rightly or wrongly.” What exactly do you mean by “rightly or wrongly” --

SATTERFIELD:What would --

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The Surge succeeded because of a reset taking place to the west of Baghdad in Anbar; by the tribes themselves ever more decisively moving [01:01:00] against Al-Qaeda, not because of the Surge decision, but outrage by Al-Qaeda progressively shutting down, destroying, their structures of life, ways of living, cultural traditions, decapitations, fingers cut off, blocking the smuggling trade upon which they had relied. And a second development, which was the Jaish al Madi pulling itself out of the fight. Not because of the Surge, but because of already progressively more effective U.S security actions and an increasing sense of insecurity on the part of Muqtada personally as to what his fate might be if he stayed in this fight. You had a perfect positive storm --not negative -- building that came together post-Surge decision, which made the Surge a critical --but not the essential --element of success

I wish it had been the other way around, [01:02:00] that, yes, we had seen all of these developments and figured, "Well, these five BCTs will make a success" It didn't happen, at least as I assess it that way. Would we have had success without those five BCTs and a reset of what U.S. force did? No. I don't think so. I think the ability to sustain, to project across the country these positive trend lines, could not have been done without the additional U.S. force elements. But had it not been for the happy accident of two Sunni-Shia critical developments which we did not know of occurring, the Surge would not have succeeded. So we were wrong in the recommendation against the Surge, but for the right analytical reasons. The

led to that kind of crisp decision. But I'll make another comment here before the question is posed. There has been speculation, which others in government at the time have raised, that the results of this process were cooked from [01:05:00] the very beginning, or almost the very beginning. That Steve Hadley had decided that there was going to be a surge, the President had decided there was going to be a surge. And all of this was, essentially, window dressing, or trimming, to provide a plausible corroboration for a decision already taken.

I can't speak to the President's own thoughts during this time or to Steve's, but nothing in the conduct of the process would bare out that assumption. Whether it is right or not, I simply can't say. But I certainly cannot make that judgment based on any of the conversations. It is true, Steve insisted that there be a surge option. Of course. Every memo has to have options a, b, and c. Even if a and c are supposed to be rejected and b is the desired outcome, you have to pose the bracketing options here. And that's how this process went forward.

SAYLE [01:06:00] Building on that, I'd like to ask a question about the role of the NSC as seen from someone in another department. The NSC is traditionally balancing a role as honest broker. At the same time NSC officials, of course, have preferences and champion certain policies. What role did you see the NSC playing in the strategy review?

SATTERFIELD: I saw the NSC playing a role that was directly shaped by the concern that a fundamental U.S. policy pillar, which the President

was being threatened. And the NSC, quite appropriately, took a significant lead in trying to provide a recommendation that would ideally be able to result in a strategy that would produce the effect, the outcomes which the President throughout all this time, would not waver from. And this is an important point. The President's language didn't alter in terms of victory, success [01:07:00] Whatever our concerns may be that a toned down rhetoric was really more appropriate, he didn't. And of course, that is his prerogative. He's the President. And the policy process, I think, quite effectively presented to him different recommendations on where to go.

But I would say this. No one should ever underestimate the power of the President's own views to trump even the most senior level and profound interagency or principal level, debate or discussion. The President in this case -- and if there are other views on this, I hope you get them in the course of this interview process -- President Bush believed to his core that success was possible. He also believed to his core that it would be inexcusable and irresponsible, in a historical context -- for [01:08:00] him having invested this amount of treasure; this amount of American, Iraqi lives since 2003 -- to hold back one final push to see if success could be achieved. Or put differently, even if you are recommending against doing this, if there is any possibility that these additional force elements can produce success, have an obligation to what has gone before -- and to history -- to try it. And I think that's a pretty fair assessment of what he thought. And in

the end, he got a fair presentation of his view and of differing views He made his choice. Was he always set on that

them, you will have made a final roll of the dice. There's no way back from this. And the magnitude, or character, of failure and the implications for broader global issues and confrontations will be profound. Those [01:11:00] were her views until the moment of the President's decision.

Once the President made the decision, then a very different policy process, which we were all onboard with, flowed. But no, there was no change in her views up until the actual decision was taken by the President. And I can recall very shortly before that decision, some very direct conversations between the two.

O'SULLIVAN: And do you remember when you thought the Surge decision was inevitable, or unfolding? People are always looking for, "When's the moment that the President made the decision?" And of course, as I think a lot of what you've said has demonstrated, this is a fluid process. But do you remember when you thought that this is the way he was going to move forward?

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SATTERFIELD: Could I add what is missing from your question set?

SAYLE: Please.

O'SULLIVAN: Yes.

SATTERFIELD: You focused on the process that led to the President's formal decision to go with the Surge. But you've left off the conditions that the President set after that decision, before he was willing to see any U.S. forces actually deployed to Iraq. And that's a very significant omission. The President was, himself, very skeptical about the ability of those forces to be efficacious [01:13:00] in their mission minus an absolute and demonstrated commitment by Nuri al-Maliki. That, a, the forces would be deployed against any element generating violence in Iraq, including Shia leaders. That was one explicit point. Secondly, the U.S. would have command over how those units were deployed and acted, and how the Iraqi units working with them would flow. No more Iraqi units being pulled out of the fight when the targets were Shia figures that couldn't be touched. The President didn't just want this as an assurance from Maliki. He wanted to see a demonstration before those new U.S. elements arrived, which couldn't be until the beginning of 2007, that there had been a shift in the way U.S. forces and associated Iraqi forces were conducting themselves. Now, in this, we no

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principals. That is not always the case where you have a principal you can access immediately who gives feedback questions, and is open to recommendations and advice. Some of this is process, some of this is personality. [01:18:00] It's both mixed in. No process works if the personalities are wrong. No personalities can work if the process is broken. And I think we've been times in recent history when both have been defective, the personalities and the processes. But in this case, I think it worked despite the differences over who was right, who was wrong in the basic set of circumstances we thought made the Surge recommendable or not recommendable. The fact is, views were aired. Views were presented without constraint. And at the end, fortunately -- but I would say only fortunately -- it worked. It all worked.

O'SULLIVAN: I think that's a great point at the end. We did have a lot of disagreement, but I don't remember anything personal, vicious, back-biting. I don't remember any of that. Maybe I phased it out.

SATTERFIELD: Not at our level.
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O'SULLIVAN: Yeah. Exactly.

SATTERFIELD: [01:19:00] No. 01:00u (0)105 0.004 TcdTw -26.36 -2.44 Td7.75ATTh N8c -0.502 Tw [(T

related to the Office of the V.P. -- a paper on the Shia option This was never a significant piece of the policy process And perhaps,

rosier. To the point that, speaking from my agency, the Secretary began to discount, simply to discount and dismiss what she was hearing. And whether or not that was true for the NSC? I think it was in many ways that we could no longer rely, because we didn't see any connectivity between these rosy projections of, We can make it work. Some of which were substantive, but most of which were personality-driven—I can make this work. They were no longer relevant. And this became much more of a Washington process than it was driven by the field. Yes, you're quite right.

SAYLE One element dealing with cooperation between departments that's come up in your closing thoughts. [01:22:00] Earlier you mentioned the Department of Defense officials and certain directions that the Pentagon was taking under the secretaryship of Donald Rumsfeld. Is there a change, after his departure, in cooperation?

SATTERFIELD Not relevant to this discussion, ,rsv<s

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had found means --to get [01:23:00] accurate appraisals of forcibilityavailability, even with the constraints applied by the Secretaryon certain principles. It didn't matter. It certainl y mattered for all that followed afterwards, sure. But not for the Surgedecision.

O'SULLIVAN: Great. As always, you're sharp and your memory seems very clearThis has been very illuminating. Is there anything you want to say in closing?

SATTERFIELD:No. I think, all in all, everyone involved in this process, from whatever view they took, participated in a way that contributed to a critical decision for national security. And if that decision had proven wrong, I still believe the process of discothn Tc -0.001 Tw 7.91 nenh(f t)3wr[(u)-14 (re)]TJ 0.004 Tc 8 /fo2N2[(u)-w4 (c)-2 (u)-issio