





with this reality.” I said, “We’re trained to [00:03:00] fight big, conventional wars. We just did, rather handily, and we purged ourselves from the lexicon of everything that dealt with insurgency as a result of the outcome of the Vietnam War.”

The senior leaders at the time were going through a bad time in the Army.





with General Casey's, I think, probably reluctant support, and did an assessment. I told Secretary Wolfowitz I would only do it if this report is being [00:09:00] given to Casey. I'm not doing it to give this report to you or to anybody else, and if Casey doesn't want the information to go forward of him, then that's OK with me. That's the contract I'll have with you or else I'm not going to do it, because I'm not going

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Department of State, academia, thinktanks, or whatever on the rest of those subjects for a day or two and then bring the secretary in and we would tell him what our viewpoints on that and we would have a conversation. That would be the essence of what we did. We never wrote reports. This was feedback by prominent [00:11:00] people who were interested in national security; Henry Kissinger on there, Speaker Foley, Speaker Gingrich, Adelman from the Reagan Administration, some business people, and a couple of guys like me who used to wear uniforms. But I insisted, after I realized that the war in Iraq was becoming considerably more complicated and we were struggling, I thought, in 2004, so I insisted that Iraq be on the agenda every time with the chairperson, and they were able to get that done. So, every time we met, Iraq was the only thing that was consistently studied, and we'd be arm wrestling cyber warfare, what's going on in China, or you can imagine all the things that you're going to deal with. And then the things were deteriorating in 2004 and we were getting pablum from the Joint Staff. [00:12:00] Newt Gingrich and I --he could see my frustration and he said, "Jack, is any of that stuff true?" "Yeah," I said, "Some of it's true but some of it's just not right. I think we're getting fed some pablum here" And this was from the J2 and the J3 and their people.

So, we went in search of someone that could tell us what was actually happening, what ground truth was, and we found Colonel Derek Harvey, who you should talk to if you haven't spoken to him. Colonel Harvey headed up an Iraq





He said, "The reason for that is simply this." He said, "This is the most formidable insurgency the west has ever faced in its history," and he said "most insurgencies, the ones that we're most familiar with -- Maoist-type insurgencies, a charismatic leader trying to deal with a grievance inside his country against a host government -- [00:15:00] that leader starves for human capital, financial capital, arms, weapon, and ammunition. He usually has to get some external support to do it." He said, "This insurgency was initiated and is being led and directed by a regime that used to be in power, and they starve for no human capital. If you analyze what protected the regime to keep it in power, the Fedayeen, the Special Republican Guard, the Ba'ath Party leadership, the -- a Douri's intelligence service -- that's 130,000 people. He said, 'I'm not suggesting they are -- that all of those are in the insurgency, but I am suggesting that's a pretty good place to start. Secondly, the amount of financial capital they have is in the billions, not in the hundreds of millions of dollars, so they don't need money and they don't need arms or ammunition. All the things, all the [00:16:00] resources that a normal insurgency has -- that a normal insurgency is reaching out for and starving for -- they have them in plenty. Not only that, they have the confidence of having run a country for 35 years and now they're attempting to regain control of that country. That, in and of itself, is quite unique. Given the fact that the Al-Qaeda has now joined them to assist them and they have created exponential capability, the --

momentum is clearly on the side of the insurgents. What my briefing is about today is to provide to you the evidence to support that premise”

After that was over, Henry Kissinger [claps hands] hit the table and said, “This briefing must go to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and must go to the President of the United States.” [00:17:00] Then, he looked to me and he said, “General Keane, when the secretary comes in tomorrow and we talk about this, you have to make the point because he’ll listen to you.” So, we thanked Colonel Harvey. We knew what was coming because Gingrich and I had a preliminary brief on this, so our jaws were not as dropped as everybody else’s in the room and we obviously had a discussion. That was a pretty important data point for us, just by virtue of what happened to this. Rumsfeld did take the briefing in November. This was September 2004. So, he took the briefing in November.

It did go to the President in December, I believe it was the Oval Office. You’d have to check with Harvey. But all the National Security team were properly assembled. And for people who are listening to this, this is extraordinary. This is a [00:18:00] colonel in the Army, buried in the bowels of the Pentagon, who’s going in to brief the President of the United States by himself and sitting there is Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Powell, National Security Advisor Rice, CIA Chief Tenet, etc. I’ve received briefers all m1 (n)-4 (e)-6aon .1 (w)2 (e)-1 (y)1



our kitbag. We just had a very successful invasion and intoxication still a residue of that, and that we could easily deal with people who are using rifles, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenade], and explosive devices to deal with the power of the United States Military. I think that's essentially what it was, and they discounted, therefore, that Harvey was, in a sense, an outsider here. Nobody in town agreed with him; not the CIA, not the DIA, not [00:21:00] the Joint Staff. Everybody was against that viewpoint. But, as it turns out, Harvey was the only one that was right. It's really quite extraordinary.

To understand that, why is Harvey right and they're all wrong? It's an interesting perspective. My viewpoint is this -- Harvey -- my analogy is a homicide detective. Just think of what they do. You've got a murder. You have some evidence, and you don't have a lot of clues. They do all this detailed homicide work. There's nothing glorious about it. It's checking records. It's checking this. It's checking that. It's systematically and methodically going through what you have and then using your imagination to get you to different, more complicated levels. And the good ones are masterful at it. So, Harvey does homicide detective work. [00:22:00] What is that? He reads and his people read the tactical field reports by the brigade and division commanders. They read them. There's nobody in town reading those, and nobody in the Pentagon reading those, and probably not too many in Central Command Headquarters reading them. So, he reads that. They read thousands of interrogation reports, getting a grasp on who is

the enemy and what is their thinking. They use document exploitation of the enemy's documents and other literature, all obviously in Arabic that they can do, and Harvey also talked to some of the insurgents themselves in safe houses arranged by the CIA in Baghdad or outside of Baghdad to -he'd bring some bottle of scotch or something and talk to these guys, kind of get a sense, where are you, what are you trying to achieve, what's going on here. So, [00:23:00] that is incredible. I call that solid homicide work that no one else in town is really doing and he comes to totally different assumptions and totally different conclusions from what everybody else does. At some point, the evidence is so overwhelming that everybody else comes to the conclu-4 (ITJ -0.00](in)-1 (g)-e)-1 ( o516t-e)-1 ( o516a o516a o

what they got, and that was that the Shiabased militia killed Sunnis, innocent people, because they were easy targets. They were soft targets. They lived in a neighborhood nearby and they would go into those neighborhoods and kill them and force their eviction from their homes and take over their homes. That's exactly what they wanted.

The bloodbath in Baghdad was on, and what was the reason for that? The reason for that is 2005 was an interesting year [00:25:00] because it was the year of the purple fingers; the elections, and the writing of the constitution that took place towards the end of the year. Then, the new government was coming into power in 2006 with their new constitution. I don't think they got actually seated until April. But, what the Sunni insurgency and the AlQaeda are trying to do is undermine that government's effectiveness before it even gets connected to the people. They wanted the people to have no confidence in this new democratic government that they just elected. They wanted to sever that relationship before it actually got started, and that was a brilliant strategy in my judgement and a strategic one and one that they were able to achieve.

The United States responded with Together Forward I, which failed, and I was talking to General Chiarelli about it, who I have a relationship [00:26:00] with. He worked for me in the Pentagon and I would talk to him about it, and I told him the operation was just to drive the insurgents out of the different areas. I said, "Unless you stay in those areas, the operation will fail. They will come right back

in on your heels.” That failed, and then they tried Together Forward II later in the year. I think it was in the late summer, fall of the year, and that failed as well. I talked to him about that on the phone, and I said, “It is predictable,” and I said, “We have fundamentally the wrong strategy here, and until we change that strategy, we’re going to lose.”

That summer, the catalyst for me actually taking direct action in this was that I was watching testimony late at night. You know how they replay it on G SPAN. I had just come back from travel and I think it was a [00:27:00] Friday. I was seeing it at night. I couldn’t sleep and I saw Abizaid and Rumsfeld providing testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and they were

little bit. I called Wolfowitz and Gingrich that weekend and the feedback was that Gingrich said, "You have to take this to the President." I said, "Well, I'm a policy board member and I will take it to the secretary of defense. That's my chain of command." Wolfowitz said, "This should go to the secretary or the President." So, I gathered that and I asked to have an appointment with the Secretary, which I knew I would get if [00:29:00] I was asking for it. Of course, they asked why.

I sat with him for an hour -plus and I took him through what was wrong, why it was wrong, and what we needed to do about it, and I to704a (d)-6 (th)-3 (m1710 ( th)-3( a





it's a sort of sad commentary, to be frank about it. Then, if we have actual intelligence where we know where the enemy is and we have then we will conduct an operation to go at that. That happens more frequently in the Special

enemy threat, then they'll do it at platoon level but not higher than that and most

have that [00:36:00] same kind of stranglehold on the people, then we can turn it around almost immediately.”

So, I said, “What we need to do is change the strategy, and if we’re going to change-- if we accept changing the strategy, then you have to remove George -- General Casey I’m sorry -- and also John --General Abizaid, both officers I knew very well, and bring in a new team. We absolutely need to do that.” I said, “To be able to accomplish a counterinsurgency strategy requires more troops and I think it’s 8 to 10 brigades is about what we need. It’s just back of the envelope. I haven’t done any troop-to-task analysis. I’m just using my judgement about what we have and I think what we would need to decentralize to that kind of ability where we’re down at platoon level and we’re doing squad patrols and [00:37:00] saturate

and Rumsfeld are running the war at the senior leadership level. To do that, you have to deal with your own fears. You have to deal with literally death every day. You're constantly signing letters to family members about soldiers being killed. You feel an enormous burden in the sense of responsibility about what you're doing. These are all very good people who are trying very hard to do the right thing, and they're in this crucible of a collaborative, cooperative relationship where they talk every day, and they need one another. They need each other to support each other emotionally to deal with the challenges of what they're dealing with on a human level and also to challenge each other. I'm sure Rumsfeld would challenge Casey and Abizaid at times, to be sure. So, I really didn't expect him to [00:39:00] say, "I agree with you and we've got to move on," or "I'm going to take that under strong consideration." But, it needed to be said so that he would understand. And I told him that you have to understand that sending more troops without changing the strategy dooms us to failure, and that's why you --George and John are not capable of changing the strategy. They're too committed to it, and giving them more troops will just give them more troops to execute a flawed strategy. So, we still fail with more troops. I said, There's a lot of people on the public air wanting more troops, what I would agree with, but what they don't understand is why the strategy is failing and what should replace it if we're going (g)-H-4 (t)-(g)



mind was the key to it. So, they were uneverbut I [00:42:00] knew they had the wherewithal to deal with this in my own view.

Then, the next meeting was with Peter Pace and he did attend the Rumsfeld meeting, but he never said a word. So, I met with him. That was controversial because he -we started out the meeting. He said, "I've been in the job as chairman for a year and I was wondering if you would give me a grade." I laughed and I said, "I'd give you an F." He was upset with me. He said, "What do you mean, an F? Why are you giving me an F?" I said, "Because, Pete, we're fighting a war but losing a war, and you're not even involved in it. You should be driving it from the Pentagon." He said, "What do you mean?" I said, "Listen, I'm a part-time guy on the Defense Policy Board. I know more about this war, what's going on, what's right about it, what's wrong with it than you do, and you're the chairman. I understand the [00:43:00] briefings you get because I talk to the intel guys that brief me on the policy board and you're getting the pablum that we used to get. You get trend analysis and campaign plans going fine despite the fact we've got hundreds of bodies on the street in Baghdad and neighborhoods are in flames. We've got sectarian conflict that's grown into a civil war but strategy is OK. We're doing fine." I said, "You've got to get your head in the war. It's easy to be distracted here. Your predecessors during the Vietnam War -the same thing happened to them. The process of running these huge military bureaucracies eats you alive, and you can let that process pull you away every single day, sapping your

energy if you let it, versus focusing your efforts on one thing and one thing only as a top priority : winning the war we're fighting , and trying to prevent future wars by building the right kind of capability [00:44:00] and forces. And that should be job one. That's not job one so that's why you get an F."

He said, "What should I do?" I said, "Well, start on Monday morning." This was Friday or Thursday. I said, "Start on Monday morning and take a deep dive into the enemy." I said, "Don't ask Burgess to do that for you." He said, "Who do I do that with?" "Colonel Derek Harvey. It's going to take you a few hours." He said, "I'm going to South America this weekend." So, he cancelled the trip right in front of me, and that's six months in the planning, believe me. You don't do that. You don't just don't go and see chief of defense, ministers of defense, all the other visits they want you to have and just cancel that over a weekend. He did that. I said, "Listen, you heard what I told Secretary Rumsfeld and I'm not going to repeat it to you, but if you believe there's anything, anything valid about what I said, if any of your instincts [00:45:00] kicked in and said to you, 'Keane maybe right here,' if that's true, then don't take my word for it. Put together a study group. Get some smart guys in here and have them take a deep dive into here's what we're trying to achieve. Print it out. Here's what our campaign plan is trying to achieve. Here's what our strategy is trying to achieve. Have them take a deep dive, and are we accomplishing that or not? Then, if we're not, which I'm comfortable they're going to find that, then what should we do about it? Just do



that.” He said, “Do you have anybody you’d recommend be on that?” I said, “I have one recommendation that I can think of.” I didn’t want to put Harvey on it because he’s too busy doing what he’s doing. I didn’t want to pull him away for weeks from what he’s doing. So, I said, “H.R. McMaster[sic].” [00:46:00] “Wav





not about helicopters and cars and staff and officers. This is about the moral commitment you make to the Constitution of the United States and what this profession of arms is truly all about, and you have to have the moral courage to deal with that. George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and many of our other World War II generals understood that. Marshall sent hundreds of thousands of poorly trained soldiers into the fight, knowing full well that many of them would be killed, and not solely because they were improperly trained but partially because they were improperly trained, and he knew that. He believed he didn't have a choice. They were running out of time [00:52:00] and they understood that. My division, the 10<sup>th</sup>, suffered enormous casualties in just one year of fighting, from June of '44 to June of '45, an extraordinary amount of casualties and other divisions were almost totally expended. So anyway, the fact that the force was tired and it's impacted by protracted wars, I understand, but that's the price we pay, and you have to have some toughminded leadership to deal with that reality.

SAYLE: Around the time you were suggesting what became the Council of Colonels, the NSC starts its own informal, secret review. The State Department is doing

KEANE: That's rubbish. That's absolute rubbish. [00:53:00] First of all, I was a

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anyway?" Of course, they do. These are thinking people and if you changed that and said, "Guys, we're not doing that. We're going to give you a winning hand, and here's what the winning hand is," and you explain to them what- and you're going to come from behind those walls and you're going to move into those towns and cities [00:55:00] and it's going to look more dangerous to do it but here's why we're doing it, they would get that. These are smart, dedicated, good people, and they would totally understand that. I think their reaction would be, "Finally, somebody understands this is all effed up." Because that's what they're saying "This is all effed up and somebody's actually thinking about maybe fixing this. Great!" People who say that --they don't even understand who our people are and what is going on in their lives every single damn day, and I have seen it. Look, I don't want to make out myself to be something I'm not. I've seen some fit in 2004 and 2005 for two to three weeks at a time. So, I got to understand and look it in the eye, but also I spent my whole life doing --in the United States Military, so I think I know the character of our people and what -- and I've been an infantry soldier all my life, so I think I know what's going on in their heads.

SAYLE: That's another quick question before I'll let you get back to the chronology because you're moving us [00:56:00] along beautifully. But, some officials who were hoping that there could be a troop increase in Iraq fairly early in the fall were receiving messages from the Joint Staff that there were no more troops. "We're out of Schlitz," was the phrase. There were studies done in the NSC that suggest

otherwise. Obviously, you believe that brigades can be found. What do you make of the Joint Staff argument there are no more troops available for Iraq at this point?

KEANE: Can you imagine President Roosevelt saying to George Marshall, "I think we're going to need some more troops," and George Marshall coming back and saying, "Mr. President, there are no more troops?" What an absurdity that is. We've got the whole Army. It sits at five hundred and something thousand at this point, and we've got the entire National Guard and Reserves and we've got the whole Marine Corps sitting at around 200,000. [00:57:00] Add all that up and we've got over 1,000,000 people under arms who are a ground force alone, so we've

everything that we've been doing" In other words, change our lengths, change who's doing the fighting. There are plenty of troops available.

SAYLE: So, I'll let you get back. The last data point you had for us was the meeting with Peter Pace. It was in September. What happens in October or November?

KEANE: I just monitor. I thought I did everything I could do. I spoke to my chain of command in the sense of Secretary Rumsfeld, Chairman Pace. I really thought something would come of what Pace was doing because I sensed Rumsfeld was not going to do anything. But I also recognized that General Pace wasn't the strongest chairman we've ever had to say that, and so I did have some [00:59:00] concerns about where it would go forward. Would he embrace it and with his leadership carry it forward? I think the right chairman getting that information could have organized those Joint Chiefs and led them, as opposed to sort of submitting and becoming one of them. I wasn't there. I'm just speculating what happened.

So, I was pretty disappointed when I realized what had happened and I wasn't doing anything publicly because I didn't think that was my place. So, nothing happened in terms of my involvement other than the fact that we continued to talk about it on the policy board, and our arguments really -- we became strained with the secretary because Iraq, when I go back to 2003 and now it's 2006, and Iraq looms [01:00:00] large in that room. Every six months it gets to be a larger presence. So we would have discussions about what's wrong with the







But, mainly what resonated between the Kagan team and myself was understanding how serious the problem was, the nature of the enemy, that this was very formidable, what we were truly up against. Our strategy was failing and it was doomed to fail. There was no way they could succeed and that we had to put in play a counterinsurgency strategy for the first time to protect the people. So we both independently came to that same conclusion with each other. I wanted the 8 to 10 brigades and they said, "Well, they're not available. There's only 5." That's how we had that humorous discussion. So, I resonated with those guys. I gave them a huge thumbs-up. I told Chris DeMuth -- "Those guys knocked it out of the ballpark. [01:05:00] They really are on it and it's a credit to them, the kind of work that they've done." And they were publishing a report. And Kagan called me and he said, "We're about to publish a report. I think we should put your name on it." And "No, no, no, you don't want to have to do that" I said, "What did I do? I didn't write a word in the report. All I did was listen to you guys and give you affirmation. You would have done it anyway without me if I never showed up." So, I said, "No, I don't want my name on it. I'm not taking credit for something I didn't do, for crying out loud."

SAYLE: Get you some more water as well, sorry.

KEANE: Yeah, OK. So, you want me to still talk?

SAYLE: Yeah, if you don't mind.

KEANE: Yeah, and I've got to stop at 10:30, guys.

SAYLE:Yeah.

KEANE: Yeah. So, they published a report and then all around the same time as this, I got a call from [01:06:00] the White House --I think it was Hadley himself, but I'm not sure. My memory escapes me, but I remember them saying that they were putting together some people to come over and brief the President who have alternative -- who they think may have alternative strategies on what to do in Iraq and we'd like you to be one of them. I said, "Who else is coming?" They said, "Well, we've invited Barry McCaffrey and Wayne Downing, and we're working on a couple of other guys." I said, "OK. Of course," I said, "Yes, absolutely." [aside] Thank you.

SAYLE:You're welcome.

KEANE: So, I was off to do that. I think it was on a Monday. Later on in that week, I got a call from the Vice President's office, and they said, [01:07:00] "We'd like you to come in on Monday and --you and Fred Kagan --

So, all of a sudden, we have two meetings. I'm going to brief the President based on, as I find out later, Hadley had asked Pace, "Are you aware of some military guys that [01:08:00] would have some impact on the President who's thinking about maybe doing something different in Iraq? I want these guys to be current on what's happening. Do you have some names for me?" So, Pace gave him McCaffrey, Downing, Keane, and then Hadley went out and got the other two guys. I'm not sure what sources -Eliot Cohen and Steve Biddle. I go to the briefing with the Vice President, largely, I believe, because of the Kagan Report, and I don't know how that happened. I mean, I don't know if Hannah talked to Fred or talked to Chris or whatever. But, the Kagan Report had come out. They had seen it, and all of this was new news. All of this has happened within a few days; the report being published, phone calls to come to a meeting in the Oval Office, phone call to go meet with the Vice President, all within days of one another.

So, at that meeting I attended [01:09:00] with the President, it was funny. We're in the west wing waiting room. Hadley comes out to see us. He says, "OK, guys, here's what we're doing," and he says, "Now, do we have your report?" So, right away, I'm saying, "Oh, my God. What's going on here?" So, McCaffrey says, "Yeah, I sent you 25 or 30 copies. You guys have got it." Then, Downing had something, too, and he handed him something. He looks at me. I said, "Was that a homework assignment?" I said, "What I've got is in my head." "That's fine."



[01:12:00] You probably know from talking to the others what they recommended, so I'm not going to get into that. I'll just talk about what I did.

I called Gingrich before I went over there and I said, "Listen, this is what's finally happening. What you wanted to have happen two or three months ago is happening." He said, "How much time have you got?" I said, "Realistically, probably 15 minutes, maybe, 10 to 15 without questions." He said, "OK. When you walk out of that room, you have to have one feeling and one feeling only -that you gave them everything that you had. You held nothing back." He said, "Most people in the Oval Office, even people that work around a President, at times leave -- don't give him everything for whatever the reason. It has to do with the power, the position, the location, everything about it." He said, "When you walk out of there, you make up your mind that you're going to give him everything." [01:13:00] I said, "That's good advice."

So, I did. I did a truncated version of what's wrong, why the strategy is failing, what realistically can we do about it, and I gave him --he was told not to interrupt us, I think, by Hadley , so we could all get this stuff down. He was not asking questions. But, when I got to the point where I said early on, "We do not have a strategy to defeat the insurgency," I could just see his body language. He sparked at that. I said, "We never had." Then, I went on to explain what our strategy was real quick and what we needed to do about it, and I said, "Mr. President, what's facing you here is -I'm going to tell you straight out there are no





dramatically different from what we were doing. I told him what we were doing, also, real quick, like presence patrols, huge castledike, forward operating bases.

And then I told him a couple of other things. I said, [01:16:00]“What you have to understand is that this will require additional troops to do and there are five” -- now I had definition from Kagan -- “five brigades available. We’re going to need some Marines as well. What we’ll do by doing this is we’re going to elevate the level of violence, which means more casualties for US, so you have to understand that. Your decision will increase US casualties. Now, if the strategy works, I’m absolutely convinced the net result will be war termination much more rapidly and, in the long run, we’re saving casualties by continuing with the status quo, which is executing a flawed strategy. However, if it doesn’t work,” and I straight out said it, getting it all out there. [01:17:00] I said, “If it doesn’t work, then we will have squandered those lives by escalating the war.” I told him, “It’s absolutely essential that you get the right people to execute this strategy and then you hold them accountable in a way that they have not been held accountable these last three years. What I mean by that is this is what we’re trying to achieve, and these are realistic milestones that we believe we can achieve them, and you hold them accountable to that.” I think that was about it. Then I left there. I did not accompany the Vice President out of the room. I think he stayed behind. We were escorted out.











Then, the second thing that came across which was also a stunner for me was the --well, after we get 'em in there, then by maybe summer, we'll start to have [01:28:00] some success so we can keep our Republican critics give them some comfort that we're going to be OK and to demonstrate to that, we'll start pulling them back out. I said, "We're not going to get the last one in there until June, all right? And now you want to start pulling them out in July." This is what I was dealing with. Then, this is what the President was dealing with. So, I

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agree with the Kagan Report.” He said, “I gave him in spades.” He said, “No, I’m not doing that. I’m going in there with Casey and Abizaid’s recommendation.”

[01:30:00] This is his unwillingness to take out and lead, I think. So, I said, “OK, I got it.”

So, I called Hannah, and I told him, I felt obligated to tell him that, and I said, “Listen, either have the Vice President or the President ask just one important question, and ask Pete. Say, ‘Pete, is he going to be a decisive force that will get us the end state that we want?’ and just have him ask that question because he’s not going to be able to say yes and he won’t say yes. He’ll mealy mouth around it.”

So anyway, out of that, I don’t know when the final decision was. You guys probably are in that process, closer than me, when they made that decision. I know that a staff -- one of the staff, when they decided to go with [01:31:00] Petraeus, somebody in the White House did call him, because he and I were talking, and somebody asked him, “Where are you on these brigades? Do you want all of them?” He said, “All of them as quickly as you can get them there, all in as soon as possible.” So, I think there were a number of things that were influencing that final decision to make the commitment, which the President, thank God, finally did. I’ve got to go do a TV interview. I could probably give you five more minutes if you want to ask another question or something.







“Sir, the hot tips here are unbelievable.” What he meant by that is he’s getting these tips from the people and all of them are real. All of them are solid. There’s caches here. There are bad guys here. He said, “I can’t handle it and my battalion commander can’t handle it.” He said --now, not all of these neighborhoods were as easily transferable as that one and there were others where we had to spend weeks and months getting the people to turn because they were --the enemy had such a stranglehold on them. But, as a proof of principle, it was there.

On my second visit, that was [01:36:00] -he went in there in January or February, something like that, so I was there with him then. I did speak at his commander’s conference for him, which he asked me to do when he gathered all the generals together. What I did is I could talk about what was wrong here in a way that he didn’t. We didn’t ever check notes but we know each other well. He was going to talk about what he was going to do and I talked about why this thing is screwed up, and I think they needed that kind of blunt, honest, honesty. And then I went back a couple of months later, and every time I visited Iraq over 2007 and 2008-- this was normally about two to three weeks at a time every few months for those two years-- half of the places would stay the same. So, I selected half the places that would always stay the same and then I would visit new places. So, I went back the second time and I actually saw anecdotally some improvement.

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going to take time, but this thing is going to work. I'm absolutely convinced of it." I provided testimony to that effect in the Congress, I had some congressmen screaming at me, actually getting emotional with me when I made that pronouncement. But, by the summer, the statistical evidence was there that it was working now. [looks at watch] I do have to go.

It was not just a surge of troops that made this work. It was not just the capacity, the fortunate capacity of General Petraeus being there and the extraordinary leadership of General Odierno, who actually put the operational plan together, and he deserves enormous credit. We don't succeed in Iraq without Odierno and his staff putting together the plan that Dave Petraeus approved, which everybody executed. It was absolutely classic.

But, [01:38:00] in addition to that, during that year, General Dubik, who was in charge of training the Iraqi Security Forces, trained 100,000 plus Iraqi Security



Then, you've got to give some credit to the Iraqi people. They had the moral courage to step up and help us, given the horrific things that were