



SAYLE:And this is Tim Sayle.

FEAVER:And so John, thank you for joining us. Why don't you begin by stating your name and also, what wasyour role in government, and how your role related to the Iraq issue in genera?

HANNAH: I'm John Hannah and at least during the Surgephase, I was the Vice

President's National Security Advisor, I guess formally his assistant, the Vice

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, was the proper title. The Vice

President, of course, was deeply involved in Iraq issues, from prewar planning, up
through the war, and certainly through the Surge, was a major player, I think an
important voice [00:01:00] in the Surge strategy. My job was to support him in
trying to advance his arguments and his views, and provide him information about
how the war was going and what might be done to try and improve the prospects
for achieving America's goals and missionin Iraq.

FEAVER:And so you served from when to when in that position?

HANNAH: In that position, I took it over in October, the very end of October of 2005, and served through until the end of the administration, on January 20, 2009.

FEAVER:If you tell the story of the Iraq Surge, when would you begin that story, and just describe your role in that story moving forward. We'll just proceed chronologically, whenever you think is the right beginning point.

HANNAH: I guess as a formal matter, I think it begins some time in the summer, [00:02:00] perhaps late summer of 2006, in the sense that you feel a coming



together of some of the Resident's main advisors, into an open recognition that





public that are prepared to go along with, if not support, this effort, if their first order security, basic security concerns, [00:07:00] are taken care of. And it becomes evident in 2004, 2005, certainly 2006, with the bombing of The Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, that the United States is failing at that first order job of fighting an insurgency and something needs to change.

FEAVER:One of the events that's salient in that period before late summer, and we'll get you up to late summer but before, is the so-called national security summit at Camp David in June. Were you involved in that and can you talk about that and its role to the Iraq strategy review?



contrary; levels of violence were increasing quite dangerously and [00:09:00] dramatically.

We had had an ongoing conversation with a number of people whol think, in some ways had a better understanding of what was happeningerhaps, than some of our commanderson the ground in Iraq. People like Colonel McMaster, like the intelligence, the DIA intelligence official, Derek Harvey, like Colonel John Nagl. These were a series of informal conversations that we'd had, at least since 2004, with people who had experience on the ground and understood how dire the situation was and how negative the trends were on the security front, despite the achievements we had achieved in the political realm. So, we kind of tried to compile all of that together before that Camp David meeting [00:10:00] in June of 2006. I attended that meeting and I guess have to say that we ended up being quite disappointed. My sense is other than the --there was, I believe a videoconference with commanders in the field, with General Casey, perhas with General Abizaid. I can't remember. I wasn't actually in on that videoconference, in which some things had gotten aired, was my understanding, about some of the concerns that were out there, but at least my impression was that there was still an awful lot of people dancing around the issue and just how severe things had gotten for our situation in Iraq.

There was a meeting with a group of experts, [00:11:00] a luncheon, that I attended. That was a pleasant enough conversation. I think a range of different



views. I'm not sure, it wasn't my impression there was any real theme that

CENTED EOD





have milestones being achieved at some level, on the political front, and that allowed you to kind of attach yourself to those things and always believe that just the next milestone -- get us through this [00:16:00] political transition to Iraq, to a permanently elected parliament and prime minister, and everything on the security situation will become much more manageable and we'll then begin to get on top of that because the politics will have moved to the place where it itself will begin to become a major factor undermining the insurgency and taking the energy out of the insurgency. And so it just took a matter of time. The U.S. Government is this huge bureaucracy and fighting a war is no different, perhaps even more intense, than anyother sort of normal event, and trying to turn that around when you have that much at stake and that many people involved in the process, I just think became a very difficult thing to do.

[00:17:00] during this period, and were there ones who you thought didn't see it your way and were maybe blocking-you already mentioned General Abizaid, but are there others? How would you rack and stack some of the other key figures? HANNAH: I think allies who -- I don't know, I mean they were probably few and far between, I mean the people we gravitated tonaturally, were the people who saw things the same way we did and who had experience on the ground. That is there were obviously individual officers, mid-grade officers, captains, colonels, who had experience on the ground, who had the same sense that things were not going

FEAVER:Were there players that you thought saw it your way and were allies of yours



HANNAH: That was my feeling, that by early 2006, I mean certainly in pushing -I can't remember exactly when we started preparing for that [00:20:00] Camp David meeting, but it was relatively early in the process. Certainly by that time, he was completely convinced that something had to change. I believe we had -again, we were providing him with an awful lot of information in 2005 and early 2006, that things on the security front were going badly. He was certainly willing to entertain ideas for how that all might change, but it's really some time in early 2006 that you get a sense that he's going to be prepared to really begin engaging the argument in a really serious way.

FEAVER:So, the Camp David meeting is a disappointment. In the public record, the next moment that gets attention is a series of Secure Video Teleconferences between the President and General Casey [00:21:00] in July, where the questions are quite sharp and pointed. Were you involved in that and can you speak to that at all?

HANNAH: I was involved in that and I attended that. I'm unsure on the dates, but if you tell me it's July that's possible. Clearly by that time, our forces in Iraq were engaged in a new effort to kind of try and secure Baghdad. Everybody had sort of come to the realization that the dramatic deterioration in security in the Iraqi capital, was going to be a make or break game for us, that we needed to get out of that. We certainly saw that effort with General Casey, as kind of the next opportunity after that Camp David event, where we'd had enough of General Casey's [00:22:00] new battle plan for Iraq, we'd had enough experience with it and



the results were disappointing enough, that it was sort of the next big opportunity for the VP, from our point of view, and perhaps from other principals in the U.S. Government, to really begin to press and make clear to the command in Iraq that there was kind of a fundamental unease in Washington, with the current state of affairs, and that we really needed to begin thinking about new directions.

FEAVER:Did you have conversations with --I'm sure you did have conversations with

Steve Hadley during this time period, on Iraq. Can you speak to them at all, how
you saw whether he was persuaded that there needed to be a review and review
the strategy? Where would you put him in that constellation [00:23:00] during
this period, the summer of 2006?

HANNAH: You know my guess, from observing Steve and watching him and talking to him, I think, like everybody, thin gs were not going well. Whether or not he had in his mind at that point in time, the need for a dramatic shift away from the existing strategy is something new, that beame the Surge I don't think I really become aware of until that kind of August, September timeframe, that in fact, the President has given him the mandate that something needs to happen here. That's when Steve first begins convening the group, that I think that realization comes, but I think certainly, in those meetings with Casey in July, I recall the Vice President being [00:24:00] sort of the most pointed, but I think others are probably weighing in as well, that they're uneasy with it, and certainly, I would put Steve in that category.



what was happening and what was your role in what was happening during this phase?

HANNAH: At some point in time in that August, September time period, and again, I don't recall exactly when, I know the VP was coming to me, saying that there was a suggestion that this kind of conversation would begin, a very discrete, quiet conversation, I think primarily amongst people at the White House, to begin looking at whether or not we needed a different kind of strategy in Iraq. And so he had kind of prepped it for me and previewed it for me. I think he was quite enthusiastic if the President was moving in this direction. Shortly, very shortly [00:27:00] thereafter, I think, Steve Hadley convened a group of us over in the West Wing.

FEAVER:Who were those?

HANNAH: You would have to jog my memory. I believe you were there.

FEAVER:Yes. Meghan.

HANNAH: I believe Meghan O'Sullivan was there, Brett McGurk was there, Steve Hadley was there of course, I'm almost certain J.D. Crouch was there, Steve's deputy. I want to say that it was either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, that there were people from State involved as well. I believe Secretary Rice might have been involved in at least one of those sessions fairly early on, certainly David Satterfield, who I believe was her top assistant for Iraq at that time, probably her counselor, Phil Zelikow. But I don't remember DoD [Department of Defense] participation. I



convincing the rest of the United States Government, our allies, and the Iraqi government, that that's the place they needed to be, that that's what a lot of this process was fundamentally about.

FEAVER:It's striking that there was no DoD representative in that mix. Why was that do you think, in the September, October timeframe?

HANNAH: It might have been discussed. I really don't --I don't recall why they weren't there. I can sort of speculate, sitting here now, that there was a general view that the leadership at DoD and certainly the leadership of our command inside of Iraq, there was a view probably that they were not enthusiastic about a fundamental change in strategy in Iraq, from [00:31:00] one of kind of building up Iraqi forces and drawing down American forces, kind of handing over the security ituation to Iraqis as quickly as we could. I think there was a sense that thaws where the Pentagon was on this, as well as the command inside of Iraq, and that if we were going to convince them to change their views, there was a first order need for other people in the U.S. Government, who weren't necessarily as wedded their particular view that DoD had, to kind of get our act together and get our arguments together on why you really did need a quite dramatic change, shift in strategy, in Iraq.

FEAVER Were you part of -- moving the story forward, along now, to the end of October - were you part of Steve Hadley's trip to Iraq and did you have a trip to [00:32:00] Iraq in this time period?



HANNAH: I was not part of Steve's trip. I did take a trip to Iraq. I can't remember now. I want to say it was some time in October of 2006, it could have been November, 2006, that I took with one of my aides, Robert Karem, to Baghdad.

FEAVER:Do we have the date for that?

SAYLE



between our forces and the Iraqi population, as well as the Iraqi political class, was, [00:34:00] I think dangerously rising, in my sense. Here was a possibility here for a rupture at some point in time. Once they believe that we were not capable of fighting the insurgency an effective way, and that we were probably on our way out of the country, that the politics in America was turning against us and we were losing breath in Iraq, that they were going to have to increasingly take matters i (n)-1 (k(k)2 (erw1k)2 (-0.005 Tc M-5 (b)-6 (re)-4 (a)-3)-3 (y)-2 (o)pi5.29995A)-6 (re)-4



have to ask the Vice President



any indication that Secretary Gates himself had ever been in that camp, as a strong proponent that this is what we needed to do, actually add U.S. forces in Iraq. So I don't have a sense that his appointment or his nomination actually changed the dynamic within the review itself and the kinds of discussions we were having.

FEAVER:So the Resident announces that there's going to be a formal interagency review headed by J.D. Crouch. Can you describe your role in that review and how that moved the story along now, with the Crouch interagency review.

HANNAH: Well, I was the -- I guess the Vice President's principal representative [00:39:00] in that review that J.D. oversaw. I mean, a series of meetings, J.D. tasked out various papers, all of the agencies kind of made their arguments, both about how they understood the situation there, what might be done to begin turning it around. I guess my recollection of it is that there was never great enthusiasm amongst the Pentagon or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for theurgeoption, but that over time, they at some level go worn down, or else they were simply -- there were other conversations occurringoutside of the review, that they were picking up messages from, that they were probably going to need to begin [00:40:00] accommodating themselves to this possibility and figuring out how they could in fact protect their equities, given that this may be where the President and



FEAVER:Can you speak a bit more granular about that process itself, the wearing down and maybe the outside messaging. In particular, what were the different positions that were represented in the room -- pdicy positions?

HANNAH: Yeah. I recall that amongst people at the White House, both on the NSC staff and the Vice President's staff, there was an agreement that things were going very badly, that we needed a shift in strategy and that it needed to be basally an adoption of true counterinsurgency strategy of actually having sufficient forces that you could successful complete the first order [00:41:00] of mission, or providing protection to the population, in order then to begin having a serious opportunity to undermine the insurgency itself, by taking away its base of popular support. I think that was largely shared by people in the White House in general. I think we had differences more on the political front, in how we sort of pursued the political components of a counterinsurgency strategy, but on the basic need for an addition, a surge of U.S. forces, and a change in strategy to being population centric. I think the White House really operated more or less in consensus on that point of view.

HANNAH: I think that to the extent that people inside most of the U.S. Government, thought that we had a political problem in Iraq, and they were right, that there was a political reconciliation problem in Iraq. They saw it as principally, almost entirely as a Sunni related problem, that Sunnis had been disenfranchised, that

what was happening and what was your role in what was happening during this phase?

HANNAH: At some point in time in that August, September time period, and again, I don't recall exactly when, I know the VP was coming to me, saying that there was a suggestion that this kind of conversation would begin, a very discrete, quiet conversation, I think primarily amongst people at the White House, to begin looking at whether or not we needed a different kind of strategy in Iraq. And so he had kind of prepped it for me and previewed it for me. I think he was quite enthusiastic if the President was moving in this direction. Shortly, very shortly [00:27:00] thereafter, I think, Steve Hadley convened a group of us over in the West Wing.

FEAVER:Who were those?

HANNAH: You would have to jog my memory. I believe you were there.

FEAVER:Yes. Meghan.

HANNAH: I believe Meghan O'Sullivan was there, Brett McGurk was there, Steve Hadley was there of course, I'm almost certain J.D. Crouch was there, Steve's deputy. I want to say that it was either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, that there were people from State involved as well. I believe Secretary Rice might have been involved in at least one of those sessions fairly early on, certainly David Satterfield, who I believe was her top assistant for Iraq at that time, probably her counselor, Phil Zelikow. But I don't remember DoD [Department of Defense] participation. I

convincing the rest of the United States Government, our allies, and the Iraqi government, that that's the place they needed to be, that that's what a lot of this process was fundamentally about.

FEAVER:It's striking that there was no DoD representative in that mix. Why was that do you think, in the September, October timeframe?

HANNAH: It might have been discussed. I really don't --I don't recall why they weren't there. I can sort of speculate, sitting here now, that there was a general view that the leadership at DoD and certainly the leadership of our command inside of Iraq, there was a view probably that they were not enthusiastic about a fundamental change in strategy in Iraq, from [00:31:00] one of kind of building up Iraqi forces and drawing down American forces, kind of handing over the security stuation to Iraqis as quickly as we could. I think there was a sense that thawas where the Pentagon was on this, as well as the command inside of Iraq, and that if we were going to convince them to change their views, there was a first order need for other people in the U.S. Government, who weren't necessarily as wedded their particular view that DoD had, to kind of get our act together and get our arguments together on why you really did need a quite dramatic change, shift in strategy, in Iraq.

FEAVER Were you part of -- moving the story forward, along now, to the end of October- were you part of Steve Hadley's trip to Iraq and did you have a trip to [00:32:00]

Iraq in this time period?

HANNAH: I was not part of Steve's trip. I did take a trip to Iraq. I can't remember now. I want to say it was some time in October of 2006, it could have been November, 2006, that I took with one of my aides, Robert Karem, to Baghdad.

FEAVER:Do we have the date for that?

SAYLE

between our forces and the Iraqi population, as well as the Iraqi political class, was, [00:34:00] I think dangerously rising, in my sense. Here was a possibility here for a rupture at some point in time. Once they believe that we were not capable of fighting the insurgency an effective way, and that we were probably on our way out of the country, that the politics in America was turning against us and we were losing breath in Iraq, that they were going to have to increasingly take matters i (n)-1 (k(k)2 (erw1k)2 (-0.005 Tc M-5 (b)-6 (re)-4 (a)-3)-3 (y)-2 (o)pi5.29995A)-6 (re)-4

have to ask the Vice President

any indication that Secretary Gates himself had ever been in that camp, as a strong proponent that this is what we needed to do, actually add U.S. forces in Iraq. So I don't have a sense that his appointment or his nomination actually changed the dynamic within the review itself and the kinds of discussions we were having.

FEAVER:So the Resident announces that there's going to be a formal interagency review headed by J.D. Crouch. Can you describe your role in that review and how that moved the story along now, with the Crouch interagency review.

HANNAH: Well, I was the -- I guess the Vice President's principal representative [00:39:00] in that review that J.D. oversaw. I mean, a series of meetings, J.D. tasked out various papers, all of the agencies kind of made their arguments, both about how they understood the situation there, what might be done to begin turning it around. I guess my recollection of it is that there was never great enthusiasm amongst the Pentagon or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for theurgeoption, but that over time, they at some level go worn down, or else they were simply -- there were other conversations occurringoutside of the review, that they were picking up messages from, that they were probably going to need to begin [00:40:00] accommodating themselves to this possibility and figuring out how they could in fact protect their equities, given that this may be where the President and

/ER:Can you speak a bit more granular about that process itself, the wearing down and maybe the outside messaging. In particular, what were the different positions that were represented in the room -- pdicy positions?

NAH: Yeah. I recall that amongst people at the White House, both on the NSC staff and the Vice President's staff, there was an agreement that things were going very badly, that we needed a shift in strategy and that it needed to be basally an adoption of true counterinsurgency strategy of actually having sufficient forces that you could successful complete the first order [00:41:00] of mission, or providing protection to the population, in order then to begin having a serious opportunity to undermine the insurgency itself, by taking away its base of popular support. I think that was largely shared by people in the White House in general. I think we had differences more on the political front, in how we sort of pursued the political components of a counterinsurgency strategy, but on the basic need for an addition, a surge of U.S. forces, and a change in strategy to being population centric. I think the White House really operated more or less in consensus on that point of view.

HANNAH: I think that to the extent that people inside most of the U.S. Government, thought that we had a political problem in Iraq, and they were right, that there was a political reconciliation problem in Iraq. They saw it as principally, almost entirely as a Sunni related problem, that Sunnis had been disenfranchised, that

HANNAH: I think that to the extent that people inside most of the U.S. Government, thought that we had a political problem in Iraq, and they were right, that there was a political reconciliation problem in Iraq. They saw it as principally, almost entirely as a Sunni related problem, that Sunnis had been disenfranchised, that

what was happening and what was your role in what was happening during this phase?

HANNAH: At some point in time in that August, September time period, and again, I don't recall exactly when, I know the VP was coming to me, saying that there was a suggestion that this kind of conversation would begin, a very discrete, quiet conversation, I think primarily amongst people at the White House, to begin looking at whether or not we needed a different kind of strategy in Iraq. And so he had kind of prepped it for me and previewed it for me. I think he was quite enthusiastic if the President was moving in this direction. Shortly, very shortly [00:27:00] thereafter, I think, Steve Hadley convened a group of us over in the West Wing.

FEAVER:Who were those?

HANNAH: You would have to jog my memory. I believe you were there.

FEAVER:Yes. Meghan.

HANNAH: I believe Meghan O'Sullivan was there, Brett McGurk was there, Steve Hadley was there of course, I'm almost certain J.D. Crouch was there, Steve's deputy. I want to say that it was either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, that there were people from State involved as well. I believe Secretary Rice might have been involved in at least one of those sessions fairly early on, certainly David Satterfield, who I believe was her top assistant for Iraq at that time, probably her counselor, Phil Zelikow. But I don't remember DoD [Department of Defense] participation. I

what was happening and what was your role in what was happening during this phase?

HANNAH: At some point in time in that August, September time period, and again, I don't recall exactly when, I know the VP was coming to me, saying that there was a suggestion that this kind of conversation would begin, a very discrete, quiet conversation, I think primarily amongst people at the White House, to begin looking at whether or not we needed a different kind of strategy in Iraq. And so he had kind of prepped it for me and previewed it for me. I think he was quite enthusiastic if the President was moving in this direction. Shortly, very shortly [00:27:00] thereafter, I think, Steve Hadley convened a group of us over in the West Wing.

FEAVER:Who were those?

HANNAH: You would have to jog my memory. I believe you were there.

FEAVER:Yes. Meghan.

HANNAH: I believe Meghan O'Sullivan was there, Brett McGurk was there, Steve Hadley was there of course, I'm almost certain J.D. Crouch was there, Steve's deputy. I want to say that it was either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, that there were people from State involved as well. I believe Secretary Rice might have been involved in at least one of those sessions fairly early on, certainly David Satterfield, who I believe was her top assistant for Iraq at that time, probably her counselor, Phil Zelikow. But I don't remember DoD [Department of Defense] participation. I

convincing the rest of the United States Government, our allies, and the Iraqi government, that that's the place they needed to be, that that's what a lot of this process was fundamentally about.

- VER:It's striking that there was no DoD representative in that mix. Why was that do you think, in the September, October timeframe?
- there. I can sort of speculate, sitting here now, that there was a general view that the leadership at DoD and certainly the leadership of our command inside of Iraq, there was a view probably that they were not enthusiastic about a fundamental change in strategy in Iraq, from [00:31:00] one of kind of building up Iraqi forces and drawing down American forces, kind of handing over the security stuation to Iraqis as quickly as we could. I think there was a sense that that was where the Pentagon was on this, as well as the command inside of Iraq, and that if we were going to convince them to change their views, there was a first order need for other people in the U.S. Government, who weren't necessarily as wedded their particular view that DoD had, to kind of get our act together and get our arguments together on why you really did need a quite dramatic change, shift in strategy, in Iraq.
- VER Were you part of -- moving the story forward, along now, to the end of October- were you part of Steve Hadley's trip to Iraq and did you have a trip to [00:32:00]

 Iraq in this time period?

FEAVER:Do we have the date for that?

FEAVER:Do we have the date for that?

have to ask the Vice President

have to ask the Vice President

and maybe the outside messaging. In particular, what were the different positions that were represented in the room -- pdicy positions?

and the Vice President's staff, there was an agreement that things were going very badly, that we needed a shift in strategy and that it needed to be basally an adoption of true counterinsurgency strategy of actually having sufficient forces that you could successful complete the first order [00:41:00] of mission, or providing protection to the population, in order then to begin having a serious opportunity to undermine the insurgency itself, by taking away its base of popular support. I think that was largely shared by people in the White House in general. I think we had differences more on the political front, in how we sort of pursued the political components of a counterinsurgency strategy, but on the basic need for an addition, a surge of U.S. forces, and a change in strategy to being population centric. I think the White House really operated more or less in consensus on that point of view.

HANNAH: I think that to the extent that people inside most of the U.S. Government, thought that we had a political problem in Iraq, and they were right, that there was a political reconciliation problem in Iraq. They saw it as principally, almost entirely as a Sunni related problem, that Sunnis had been disenfranchised, that

HANNAH: I think that to the extent that people inside most of the U.S. Government, thought that we had a political problem in Iraq, and they were right, that there was a political reconciliation problem in Iraq. They saw it as principally, almost entirely as a Sunni related problem, that Sunnis had been disenfranchised, that

what was happening and what was your role in what was happening during this phase?

HANNAH: At some point in time in that August, September time period, and again, I don't recall exactly when, I know the VP was coming to me, saying that there was a suggestion that this kind of conversation would begin, a very discrete, quiet conversation, I think primarily amongst people at the White House, to begin looking at whether or not we needed a different kind of strategy in Iraq. And so he had kind of prepped it for me and previewed it for me. I think he was quite enthusiastic if the President was moving in this direction. Shortly, very shortly [00:27:00] thereafter, I think, Steve Hadley convened a group of us over in the West Wing.

FEAVER:Who were those?

HANNAH: You would have to jog my memory. I believe you were there.

FEAVER:Yes. Meghan.

HANNAH: I believe Meghan O'Sullivan was there, Brett McGurk was there, Steve Hadley was there of course, I'm almost certain J.D. Crouch was there, Steve's deputy. I want to say that it was either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, that there were people from State involved as well. I believe Secretary Rice might have been involved in at least one of those sessions fairly early on, certainly David Satterfield, who I believe was her top assistant for Iraq at that time, probably her counselor, Phil Zelikow. But I don't remember DoD [Department of Defense] participation. I

what was happening and what was your role in what was happening during this phase?

HANNAH: At some point in time in that August, September time period, and again, I don't recall exactly when, I know the VP was coming to me, saying that there was a suggestion that this kind of conversation would begin, a very discrete, quiet conversation, I think primarily amongst people at the White House, to begin looking at whether or not we needed a different kind of strategy in Iraq. And so he had kind of prepped it for me and previewed it for me. I think he was quite enthusiastic if the President was moving in this direction. Shortly, very shortly [00:27:00] thereafter, I think, Steve Hadley convened a group of us over in the West Wing.

FEAVER:Who were those?

HANNAH: You would have to jog my memory. I believe you were there.

FEAVER:Yes. Meghan.

HANNAH: I believe Meghan O'Sullivan was there, Brett McGurk was there, Steve Hadley was there of course, I'm almost certain J.D. Crouch was there, Steve's deputy. I want to say that it was either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, that there were people from State involved as well. I believe Secretary Rice might have been involved in at least one of those sessions fairly early on, certainly David Satterfield, who I believe was her top assistant for Iraq at that time, probably her counselor, Phil Zelikow. But I don't remember DoD [Department of Defense] participation. I

convincing the rest of the United States Government, our allies, and the Iraqi government, that that's the place they needed to be, that that's what a lot of this process was fundamentally about.

AVER:It's striking that there was no DoD representative in that mix. Why was that do you think, in the September, October timeframe?

NNAH: It might have been discussed. I really don't --I don't recall why they weren't there. I can sort of speculate, sitting here now, that there was a general view that the leadership at DoD and certainly the leadership of our command inside of Iraq, there was a view probably that they were not enthusiastic about a fundamental change in strategy in Iraq, from [00:31:00] one of kind of building up Iraqi forces and drawing down American forces, kind of handing over the security stuation to Iraqis as quickly as we could. I think there was a sense that thawas where the Pentagon was on this, as well as the command inside of Iraq, and that if we were going to convince them to change their views, there was a first order need for other people in the U.S. Government, who weren't necessarily as wedded their particular view that DoD had, to kind of get our act together and get our arguments together on why you really did need a quite dramatic change, shift in strategy, in Iraq.

AVER Were you part of -- moving the story forward, along now, to the end of October- were you part of Steve Hadley's trip to Iraq and did you have a trip to [00:32:00]

Iraq in this time period?

FEAVER:Do we have the date for that?

FEAVER:Do we have the date for that?

have to ask the Vice President